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Victory for Clergy Sexual Abuse Victims: The Ninth
Circuit Strips the Holy See of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity in Doe v. Holy See
I. INTRODUCTION
In Doe v. Holy See,1 the Ninth Circuit narrowly upheld the
district court’s refusal to grant a motion to dismiss by the Holy See,
which claimed sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”).2 At issue was whether an exception to
sovereign immunity permitted an alleged victim of sexual abuse by a
Roman Catholic priest to bring suit against the Holy See, otherwise
known as the Vatican.3 As part of its inquiry, the Ninth Circuit
examined the pleadings to determine whether the alleged activities of
the Holy See fit one of the statutory exceptions to sovereign
immunity––in this case, either the commercial activity exception or
the tortious exception.4 Additionally, the court examined the basis
for holding the Holy See vicariously liable for the actions of its
affiliated U.S. corporations. The court ultimately refused to address
5
the commercial activity exception on jurisdictional grounds, but it
addressed the remaining issues of the tortious exception and
vicarious liability.6 The court held that the tortious exception
applied, but only for a single respondeat superior claim against the
Holy See.7 The court also held that the Holy See could not be held

1. 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006).
3. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1069. Although in common parlance the “Holy See” and the
“Vatican” are synonymous, they are, in fact, “separate entities . . . . The Holy See itself is not a
state, but it is the entity that is recognized as a sovereign.” Lucian C. Martinez, Jr., Sovereign
Impunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bar Lawsuits Against the Holy See in
Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 139 (2008) (footnote omitted).
4. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1074, 1081–85. For an explanation of these statutory exceptions,
see infra Part III.
5. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1074.
6. Id. at 1077–85.
7. Id. at 1069.
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vicariously liable for the behavior of its affiliated U.S. corporations
because the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged “day-to-day control”
over these corporations or an abuse of the corporate form.8
This Note argues that, although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Doe v. Holy See was correct, the court’s rationale for denying a review
of the commercial activity exception is suspect because the majority
demonstrated an apparently willful misunderstanding of the
applicable legal standards. Additionally, this Note argues that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision will have a lasting impact on future clergy
sexual abuse litigation because (1) plaintiffs throughout the country
will have a drafting guide to more carefully plead their claims; and
(2) many more states may consider adopting Oregon’s expansive
view of respondeat superior liability as a civil means of vindicating
victims of clergy sexual abuse.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
John V. Doe alleged that in approximately 1965, when he was
fifteen or sixteen years old, he was sexually abused multiple times by
Father Andrew Ronan, a parish priest at St. Albert’s Church in
Portland, Oregon.9 For these injuries, Doe not only brought claims
against the Archdiocese of Portland and other affiliated
organizations10 in the United States, but also against the Holy See,11
which is the head of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church.12 The
claims against the Holy See included (1) vicarious liability for the
acts of its instrumentalities and domestic corporations, (2)
respondeat superior for the actions of Ronan as an alleged employee
of the Holy See, and (3) direct liability based on the Holy See’s own
negligence in retention and supervision of Ronan, and its failure to
warn of his harmful propensities.13 In response, the Holy See claimed
sovereign immunity from suit under the FSIA and moved the court
to dismiss the case.14

8. Id. at 1079–80.
9. Id. at 1070.
10. Doe also named the Chicago Bishop and the Order of the Friar Servants, of which
Ronan was a member, as defendants. Id. at 1070.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1091 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting the “Holy See’s dual role as not only a
sovereign government but also the head of a worldwide church”).
13. Id. at 1069 (per curiam).
14. Id. at 1071.
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The district court denied the motion to dismiss in part, and held
that nearly all of Doe’s tort claims (even the vicarious liability claims)
could proceed against the Holy See by way of the tortious exception
in the FSIA.15 The court determined that the Holy See could not
take advantage of an exception to the tortious exception (the
discretionary function exclusion) because the Holy See’s behavior
was not a “policy-based” decision susceptible to the “balancing of
competing interests.”16 The court also found that even though the
acts of the Holy See could be otherwise considered “commercial
activity,”17 the commercial activity exception could not apply because
Doe’s claims “sound[ed] in tort.”18
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
To better understand why the district court and the Ninth
Circuit struggled with the application of the FSIA in this case, it is
helpful to trace the relevant legal history. For a period of over 140
years, the United States has granted immunity to foreign sovereigns
from being subject to lawsuits in the United States as a “matter of
grace and comity[,] . . . not a restriction imposed by the
Constitution.”19 However, starting in 1952, the State Department
announced a new approach, called the “restrictive” theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, where immunity would only extend to the
“public acts” of a foreign sovereign.20 Nevertheless, this new
approach proved to be too burdensome to implement and too
susceptible to “diplomatic pressures.”21 Thus, in 1976, Congress
passed the FSIA, which largely codified the “restrictive” theory of
sovereign immunity,22 and states as its purpose to “serve the interests
of justice and . . . protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in the United States courts.”23

15.
claim).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. (noting that the district court did grant the Holy See’s motion as to Doe’s fraud
Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 956 (D. Or. 2006).
See id. at 940–41.
Id. at 942.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 488.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
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The FSIA is now the only means of obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state,24 and foreign sovereigns have immunity as a general
rule, unless one of the exceptions in the statute applies, such as the
commercial activity exception25 or the tortious exception.26
A. Commercial Activity Exception
As an exception to the general rule, the FSIA states that foreign
sovereign immunity does not apply to an action “based upon a
commercial activity . . . by the foreign state.”27 Even though the
FSIA defines “commercial activity,” the definition is somewhat
circular: “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act.”28 The FSIA never directly
defines “commercial,”29 leaving its interpretation to the courts.30 In
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., the Supreme Court
unanimously determined that “[a] foreign state engaging in
‘commercial’ activities ‘do[es] not exercise powers peculiar to
sovereigns’; rather, it ‘exercise[s] only those powers that can also be
exercised by private citizens.’”31
Even if a foreign sovereign has engaged in “commercial activity,”
this activity or the act connected to the commercial activity must also
form the basis of the plaintiff’s action.32 In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, a

24. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
26. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
27. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
28. Id. § 1603(d).
29. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992).
30. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359 (1993) (“[C]ongressional diffidence
necessarily results in judicial responsibility to determine what a ‘commercial activity’ is for
purposes of the Act.”).
31. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976)) (alternations in original). Profit motivation is largely
immaterial to the analysis. Id.; Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018,
1024 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]here is no indication that Congress intended the presence of a
profit motive . . . to be a threshold requirement for applying the commercial activity
exception.”); cf. H.R. REP No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6615 (“[I]f an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial nature could readily
be assumed.”).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
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divided33 Supreme Court held that the act of arresting and torturing
an American by the Saudi government did not meet the
requirements of the commercial exception.34 Specifically, although
the plaintiff alleged that his recruitment in the United States and his
employment in Saudi Arabia (arguably commercial activities) were
the bases of his injuries, the Court determined that his complaint was
actually “based upon” personal injuries committed in Saudi Arabia.35
B. Tortious Exception
In addition to the commercial exception, the FSIA also declares
that foreign sovereign immunity does not apply to non-commercial
torts
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury . . . caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to . . . any claim based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be
abused.36

Although the exact relationship between the commercial exception
and the tortious exception is unclear,37 the latter clearly authorizes
suits based not only on the foreign state’s own torts, but also the
38
torts of its employees. In order to apply the tortious exception to
the acts of the foreign state’s employees, the plaintiff must allege an
employment relationship and that the tortious act fell within the

33. Although almost all the members of the Court agreed as to the judgment, there
were four different opinions disagreeing with the majority opinion’s analysis.
34. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361–62.
35. Id. at 358.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006).
37. Judge Berzon argued that “[n]othing in the FSIA suggests that the commercial
activity exception and the tortious act exception are mutually exclusive and cannot possibly
apply to the same conduct. Nor does Nelson, or any other controlling case, authorize reading
such a requirement into the statute.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Berzon, J., dissenting).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2006).
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Since the FSIA doesn’t define
scope of that employment.
“employment” or “scope of employment,” state law governs their
meaning.40
Although a foreign state may be liable for certain torts, it will
preserve its sovereign immunity if it can invoke the two-part
“discretionary function” exclusion.41 First, the challenged action or
omission must “involve an element of judgment or choice.”42 An
action is not discretionary if law or policy “specifically prescribes a
course of action.”43 Second, even if the action involves discretion, it
must be determined “whether that judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”44 This
exclusion is designed to protect decisions “grounded in social,
economic, and political policy.”45
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In the present case, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit
issued a per curiam opinion reversing the district court’s decision to
remove the Holy See’s sovereign immunity. However, the Ninth
Circuit did affirm the district court’s decision to allow a respondeat
superior claim to proceed against the Holy See.
A. Vicarious Liability
The Holy See argued that it should not be held liable for the acts
or omissions of its U.S. corporations because “Doe has not alleged
facts that would overcome the presumption of separate juridical

39. Id.
40. O’Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (“The FSIA
provides no definition of ‘official’ or ‘employee.’ Whether . . . clergy are employees of the Holy
See would appear to be a question of . . . state law.”); Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925,
948 (D. Or. 2006) (determining whether someone was an “employee” is governed by state
law (citing Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 325 (9th Cir. 1996))).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2006).
42. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (applying the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act). Even
though the FSIA does not define “discretionary function,” the “language of the discretionary
function exclusion closely parallels the language of a similar exclusion in the Federal Tort
Claims Act.” Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083 (per curiam).
43. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
44. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
45. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
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status such that the acts of the latter could be attributed to the
former.”46 The Ninth Circuit agreed.47 In particular, the court
explained that Doe’s complaint did not allege a “day-to-day, routine
involvement of the Holy See in the affairs of the [corporations].”48
The court conceded that Doe’s complaint had alleged that the
corporations were “agents” of the Holy See, but the court found
that the mere use of the word “agent” was not sufficient.49
Additionally, in regard to an equitable prong, the court found that
Doe’s complaint failed to allege “that the Holy See ha[d]
inappropriately used the separate status of the corporations . . . for
the purpose of evading liability for its own wrongs.”50
B. Tortious Exception
The Ninth Circuit determined that Doe had appropriately
pleaded his respondeat superior claim against the Holy See, but that
the Holy See qualified for the discretionary function exclusion.
1. Respondeat superior
The Holy See argued that Doe had failed to plead “sufficient
facts to demonstrate that Ronan was an ‘employee’ of the Holy
See . . . because the word ‘employee’ is a legal conclusion.”51
Although the court recognized that “employee” has a technical
meaning, it was “highly skeptical of the notion that . . . use of the
word ‘employee’ in a complaint is insufficient to establish an
allegation of an employment relationship.”52 The court recognized
that merely stating that Ronan was an “employee” was sufficient to
put the Holy See on notice of the allegation because the

46. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1076.
47. Id. at 1079. There are two instances where the presumption of separate juridical
status can be overcome: (1) “where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner
that a relationship of principal and agent is created,” and (2) where recognizing the separate
juridical status “would work fraud or injustice.” First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
48. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1079 (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065,
1073 (9th Cir. 2002)).
49. Id at 1080.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1081.
52. Id.
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commonplace meaning of “employee” was not “so complex or
contentious . . . [as to] prevent a defendant from understanding the
factual basis for the claim.”53
In addition to the inquiry of whether Doe had sufficiently pled
an employment relationship, the court inquired into whether Doe
had pled that Ronan had been acting within his “scope of
employment.”54 Since the FSIA does not define this phrase, the
court turned to Oregon law, under which an employer could be held
liable as long as an employee’s authorized activities constituted a
“necessary precursor” to committing unauthorized actions.55 The
court found that Doe had sufficiently met this test because he
alleged that he had come “to know Ronan ‘as his priest, counselor
and spiritual adviser,’” and that Ronan had used his “‘position of
authority’ to ‘engage in harmful sexual contact upon’ Doe.”56
2. Discretionary function exclusion
The Ninth Circuit held that the Holy See was not directly liable
for its alleged negligence because its behavior was covered by the
FSIA’s discretionary function exclusion, an exception to the tortious
exception.57 Specifically, the court determined that Doe had failed to
allege that the Holy See had a “specific and mandatory” policy
prescribing its conduct, and had failed to show that the Holy See’s
actual judgment was not the kind that the exception was “designed
to shield.”58 Although Doe did allege that there had been “policies,
59
practices, and procedures” to avoid firing or warning others of
abusive priests, the court held that this was insufficient to show that
the Holy See effectively had no discretion in the matter.60 As to
61
whether the discretionary exclusion was “designed to shield” the
Holy See’s judgments, the court determined, on its own, that the

53. Id. at 1081–82.
54. Id. at 1082.
55. Id. (quoting Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Or. 1999)); see infra notes
81–83 and accompanying text.
56. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083.
57. Id. at 1069, 1083.
58. Id. at 1083–84.
59. Id. at 1084
60. See id.
61. Id.
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Holy See hypothetically might have had a legitimate policy rationale,
such as a concern over reputation, staffing shortages, or other
issues.62
C. Commercial Activity Exception
Doe cross-appealed from the district court’s decision to deny the
application of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. However,
the Holy See argued that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction
over this cross-appeal because it was not “‘inextricably intertwined’
with the collaterally appealable issue”––the denial of foreign
sovereign immunity.63 Although the court recognized that it had the
prudential and discretionary power to support a district court
decision on alternative grounds, it refused the opportunity because it
would have involved “a vast expansion of the issues in and
complexity of the appeal.”64
D. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Berzon
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Berzon disagreed with the
majority’s refusal to consider the application of the commercial
activity exception. She quoted Ninth Circuit case law describing how
the court was fully entitled “to preserve the result that the district
court reached, either by following the district court’s reasoning or by
a different rationale.”65 She disputed the majority’s prudential
concerns as nonexistent since the issue “was fully litigated below, the
district court decided the question, and the issue has been fully
briefed and argued here.”66
As to the application, Judge Berzon repeatedly described how
the “commercial activity” test does not require any profit motive,
but only that the activity is not “peculiar to sovereigns.”67 She
argued that the Holy See’s alleged activity is “commercial activity”
62. Id. at 1085. The court explained that “[t]he Holy See’s failure to present any
evidence that its actions were actually based on policy considerations is not relevant to whether
the discretionary function exception applies.” Id. According to the court, the sovereign’s
actions only need to be “susceptible” to a policy analysis. Id. (quoting Kelly v. United States,
241 F.3d 755, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001)).
63. Id. at 1074.
64. Id. at 1076 n.5.
65. Id. at 1088 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1089–90.
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because the employment relationship between the Holy See and
Ronan was not of a “quintessentially sovereign” capacity.68
Furthermore, she argued, Doe’s negligence claims were “based
upon” this employment relationship and that even with an arguably
“tortious essence,” there was no controlling authority that made the
commercial activity exception inapplicable to Doe’s negligence
claims.69
E. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fernandez
In responding to the dissent, Judge Fernandez wrote a
concurring opinion to dispute the “oxymoronic proposition that
church functions are commercial.”70 He described the idea of
characterizing church functions as commercial as “the veriest
cynicism about religion” and that “[n]ormal legal usage and
common sense recoil” from such characterizations.71 Ultimately, he
concluded that although the Holy See is an abnormal type of foreign
sovereign, it is not a “merchant” or otherwise engaged in “trade and
traffic or commerce.”72
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Holy See is important
because it is the second case this year where the Holy See has been
thwarted trying to preserve its sovereign immunity.73 The court
correctly determined that Doe’s respondeat superior claim must
proceed because the applicable state law essentially mandated that
result. However, the court’s rationale for denying a review of the
commercial activity exception is highly suspect since the majority
apparently had a fundamental misunderstanding of the applicable
legal standards.
A. Basis for Respondeat Superior Decision
The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that Doe’s respondeat
superior claim had satisfied the requirements of the tortious
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

44

Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1094, 1096.
Id. at 1097 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1098.
The other is O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009).
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exception, thereby removing the Holy See’s sovereign immunity for
that claim. This decision was easily supported by statute, case law,
and policy considerations. The plain language of the FSIA’s tortious
exception allowed suit against sovereigns for a “tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.”74 Since the FSIA does not define the key terms,
“employee” and “scope of employee,” the court then turned to
Oregon case law.75
Oregon case law has been on the frontier of expanding the reach
of the respondeat superior doctrine and even has recent case law that
specifically addresses respondeat superior claims arising from sexual
abuse by Roman Catholic clergy.76 As to the first issue, the definition
of “employee” under Oregon law includes a list of factors, including,
but not limited to, the “right to . . . control,” and the “right to
fire.”77 The district court found that Doe had satisfied this test
because he alleged that the Holy See had the “right to control”
Ronan, and demonstrated this control by actually “plac[ing] [him]
in Portland, Oregon.”78 Interestingly enough, while the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court on this issue, it did not even
acknowledge this test or the district court’s analysis at all.79 Instead,
the court primarily focused on the issue of whether Doe’s bare
allegation that Ronan was “employed” by Holy See was sufficient
under modern notice pleading standards.80 However puzzling, it is
quite possible that the court didn’t include the actual analysis under
Oregon law because it thought that, since a bare allegation of

74. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006).
75. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
76. Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory:
Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 241 (2007)
(noting that Oregon is one state that has taken an “expansive approach to scope of
employment”); see also Michael J. Sartor, Respondeat Superior, Intentional Torts, and Clergy
Sexual Misconduct: The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 690
(2005) (“[O]ne jurisdiction [Oregon] has recognized the validity of respondeat superior
claims asserted against religious organizations in cases involving clergy sexual misconduct.”).
77. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 948 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Stamp v. Dep’t
of Consumer & Bus. Servs., 9 P.3d 729, 731 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)).
78. Id. at 949 (citation omitted).
79. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
80. Id. at 1165.
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employment was sufficient under notice pleading, including the state
law analysis would have been superfluous. In either case, the Ninth
Circuit had adequate support to conclude that Doe had satisfied the
employment requirement of the tortious exception.
As to the second issue, the Ninth Circuit cited an Oregon case,
Fearing v. Bucher, that dealt with substantially the same underlying
issue of whether the tortious acts of a priest could still be considered
part of his “scope of employment.”81 In Fearing, the court held that
an employer could be held liable under respondeat superior for the
otherwise unauthorized actions of a priest who used his position as a
priest, pastor, and spiritual mentor as a “necessary precursor” to the
eventual molestation of a child.82 Doe’s complaint satisfied this test
because the sexual abuse was necessarily preceded by Ronan’s
relationship with Doe as “priest, counselor, and spiritual advisor,”
and a “direct outgrowth” of Ronan’s “position of authority” over
him.83 Since the facts are so similar between Fearing and the instant
case, the Ninth Circuit was not only effectively bound to follow the
“necessary precursor” and “direct outgrowth” analysis from Fearing,
but also reach the same conclusion.
Beyond the substantive law cited by the court, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to allow the respondeat superior claim to proceed
against the Holy See is also strongly bolstered by the underlying
policies behind respondeat superior liability. Most prominently,
employers must realize that they are in the best position to carefully
screen new employees and supervise existing ones so as to not only
reduce the liability of the company, but also to reduce and avoid
causing future injuries to the public.84 Although the Holy See is
obviously not directly involved in the hiring or supervision of all
church workers throughout the world, it is still in the best position
to make and enforce church-wide policy. There is no doubt that as
the head of a rigidly hierarchical organization it had the unequivocal
power to set and enforce rigorous hiring and supervision policies
throughout all levels of the church with a goal of protecting the

81.
82.
83.
84.

46

977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999).
Id.
Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083.
See Sartor, supra note 76, at 723–24.
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public from the harmful actions of its servants.85 Given that the Holy
See was, almost certainly, in the best position to make and enforce
employment policies to protect the public, the Ninth Circuit was
justified in removing the Holy See’s sovereign immunity in order to
determine whether it should be held responsible for the harmful
actions of its alleged employee.
An additional policy consideration that supports the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is that employers are usually in a better position to
“spread losses equitably” and insure that victims are compensated,
especially when the perpetrator is judgment proof.86 During the past
decade there has been a firestorm of clergy sexual abuse litigation.
Even though this litigation has been effective at garnering large
settlements and verdicts against local branches of the worldwide
Roman Catholic Church,87 some plaintiffs have encountered
problems actually collecting damages from these organizations,
especially when they later declare bankruptcy to protect church assets
from judgment.88 Furthermore, since many, if not most, members of
the Roman Catholic clergy take a vow of poverty,89 the actual
perpetrators of sexual abuse are often judgment-proof, leaving
victims without adequate compensation for their injuries. In
contrast, the Holy See has extensive financial resources90 with the
ability to fairly compensate victims of sexual abuse, such as Doe, for
the irreparable damage caused by its servants and instrumentalities.91
Given the tremendous physical, mental, and financial costs borne by
victims, families, and society at large, the policy of insuring that

85. Cf. Martinez, supra note 3, at 143–44, 150–53 (“[I]n the most important matters,
the Holy See is capable of using its considerable authority over the worldwide church in an
attempt to bring about the desirable outcome.”).
86. See Sartor, supra note 76, at 724–25.
87. See, e.g., Maria L. La Ganga & Duke Helfand, Etching Abuse in Church’s Memory,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at A1 (“The Catholic Church in the U.S. has paid out more than
$2 billion in legal settlements.”).
88. See id. (“Six dioceses have filed for bankruptcy.”); Allison Walsh Smith, Chapter 11
Bankruptcy: A New Battleground in the Ongoing Conflict Between Catholic Dioceses and SexAbuse Claimants, 84 N.C. L. REV. 282, 315 (2005) (“[A]ny claimant who settled or won a
claim against a diocese pre-petition [for bankruptcy] was prevented from collecting on that
settlement or judgment.”).
89. See Sartor, supra note 76, at 724.
90. See, e.g., Lisa O’Connor, Vatican Loses EUR9.1m, SUNDAY MIRROR, July 13, 2008,
at 24 (“Experts estimate that the Vatican’s total wealth is in excess of EUR5 billion.”).
91. Cf. Martinez, supra note 3, at 143–44.
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victims are compensated for their injuries certainly justifies the Holy
See’s loss of sovereign immunity for Doe’s respondeat superior
claim.
B. Dodging the Commercial Activity Exception
The Ninth Circuit unreasonably avoided the issue of whether the
commercial activity exception applied to the Holy See’s alleged
behavior. Taken on its face, the three-member panel had the power
to reject Doe’s cross appeal concerning the district court’s refusal to
apply the commercial activity exception. However, by analyzing the
per-curiam opinion and the accompanying concurring opinion, the
rationale of the two-to-one decision is suspect since the majority
apparently had a fundamental misunderstanding of the applicable
legal standards.
As to the per curiam opinion, the majority refused to address the
commercial activity exception because it claimed that the issue “seeks
to expand our inquiry into the arcane question of whether church
functions are commercial activity because churches receive financial
support from their parishioners.”92 However, the court’s paraphrase
of the legal issue is incorrect. Although “commercial activity” might
refer to trade and exchange in common parlance, in the context of
the FSIA the phrase is a term of art93 that concerns whether a foreign
sovereign is exercising “powers peculiar to sovereigns.”94 Whether
the Holy See receives financial support from parishioners is irrelevant
to the real question of whether the employment relationship
between the Holy See and Ronan was of a “quintessentially
sovereign” capacity, such as “civil service, diplomatic, or military.”95
This misapprehension can, most likely, be explained by
examining the concurring opinion of Judge Fernandez, who was part
of the 2-1 per curiam decision. He said that it was an “oxymoronic
proposition that church functions are commercial,” and the idea of
characterizing church functions as commercial is “the veriest
cynicism about religion.”96 However, his legal support for these
propositions is highly suspect. He quoted Weltover, which is the

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

48

Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Id. at 1096 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Doe, 557 F.3d at 1089 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1097 (Fernandez, J., concurring).

DO NOT DELETE

3/12/2010 3:06 PM

35

Victory for Clergy Sexual Abuse Victims

principal Supreme Court case on the issue.97 However, he
conveniently minimized the Court’s language stating, “the question
is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit
motive,”98 and he altogether omitted the Court’s language stating
that a foreign state engages in commercial activities when it does not
“exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns.”99
Instead, Judge Fernandez focused on the Court’s mention of
“trade and traffic and commerce” as if to suggest that the meaning
of “commercial activity” were entirely limited to profit-motivated
activity.100 But the Court in Weltover later mentions that “[e]ngaging
in a commercial act does not require the receipt of fair value, or even
compliance with the . . . requirements of consideration.”101 Yet,
Judge Fernandez appeared immovable, and simply could not get past
his concern over the apparent contradiction of “religion” and
“commerce.” Instead of merely disagreeing with the applicable legal
test, it appears that he crafted his own version to fit a desired result.
Given this suspect reasoning and analysis, the rationale of the 2-1
majority also is suspect in its decision to deny a review of the
commercial activity exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Holy See opened the doors
of justice for one alleged victim of sexual abuse by allowing him to
bring suit against the Holy See. While the court correctly determined
that the law must permit Doe’s respondeat superior claim against the
Holy See, its rationale for denying a review of the commercial
activity exception is suspect because the majority misunderstood the
applicable legal standards.
Aside from providing a landmark victory for victims of alleged
clergy sexual abuse at St. Albert’s Church in Portland, Oregon, this
case will have a lasting impact on future clergy sexual abuse litigation
throughout the country. First, plaintiffs throughout the country will
have a drafting guide to carefully plead their claims so as to avoid the
problems the Ninth Circuit found with Doe’s complaint. In
97.
98.
at 614).
99.
100.
101.

Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
See Doe, 557 F.3d at 1097 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.
See Doe, 557 F.3d at 1097–98.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 616.
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addition, many more states may consider adopting Oregon’s
expansive view of respondeat superior liability as a civil means of
vindicating victims of clergy sexual abuse.
Edan Burkett
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